Deterministic Secure Direct Communication Using Ping-pong protocol
  without public channel by Cai, Qing-yu
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
01
04
8v
1 
 1
3 
Ja
n 
20
03
Deterministic Secure Direct Communication Using Ping-pong protocol without public
channel
Qing-yu Cai
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Based on an EPR pair of qubits and allowing asymptotically secure key distribution, a secure
communication protocol is presented. Bob sends either of the EPR pair qubits to Alice. Alice
receives the travel qubit. Then she can encode classical information by local unitary operations on
this travel qubit. Alice send the qubit back to Bob. Bob can get Alice’s information by measurement
on the two photons in Bell operator basis. If Eve in line, she has no access to Bob’s home qubit.
All her operations are restricted to the travel qubit. In order to find out which opeartion Alice
performs, Eve’s operation must include measurements. The EPR pair qubits are destroyed. Bob’s
measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis can help him to judge whether Eve exist in
line or not. In this protocal, a public channel is not necessary.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd
The idea of quantum cryptography was first proposed in the 1970s by Stephen Wiesner [1] and by Charles H.
Bennett of IBM and Gilles Brassard of The University of Montreal [5]. The motive that we build quantum-mechanical
communications channels is not only to transmit information securely without being eavesdropped on but also to
transmit information more efficiently. We consider that quantum channel is secure because that quantum physics
establishes a set of negative rules stating things that cannot be done [2]: (1) One cannot take a measurement without
perturbing the system. (2) One cannot determine simultaneously the position and the momentum of a particle
with arbitrarily high accuracy. (3) One cannot simultaneously measure the polarization of a photon in the vertical-
horizontal basis and simultaneously in the diagonal basis. (4) One cannot draw pictures of individual quantum
processes. (5) One cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state. These characters of quantum physics let us have
ability to exchange information securely.
As is well known, operations on one particle of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair cannot influence the marginal
statistics of measurements on the other particle. Let’s suppose that Bob have two photons which are maximally
entangled in their polarization degree of freedom
|ψ± > = 1√
2
(|01 > ±|10 >)
|φ± > = 1√
2
(|00 > ±|11 >) (1)
These states are maximally entangled states in the two particle Hilbert space H = HA ⊗HB. Each one of them is
not polarized because the reduced density matrices of one photon, say A,
ρ±
A
= TrB{|ψ± >< ψ±|} = TrB{|φ± >< φ±|} (2)
is complete mixture. Since ρ±
A
= 1
2
IA, no one can distinguish |ψ± > (or |φ± >) only by using the information of
photon A. Anyone who has these two photons can perform a measurement on both photons in Bell operator basis
which can help him to distinguish the states {|ψ+ >, |ψ− >, |φ+ >, |φ− >} from each other. Suppose Bob has two
photons in Bell states |ψ± > or |φ± >, he gives one of them to Alice and keeps another. Then Alice perform an
operation which can be described by a unitary operator to the photon she obtained from Bob
∧
σ
A
Z
|ψ± > = |ψ∓ >
∧
σ
A
Z
|φ± > = |φ∓ > (3)
where
∧
σ
A
Z
≡ (∧σZ ⊗I) = (|0 >< 0| − |1 >< 1|)⊗I. The local operation of Alice can be encoded in states |ψ± >. So
it becomes nonlocal information. We will give a secure communication protocal based on this. In order to realize
the communication, first, Bob prepares an EPR pair photons (suppose in state |ψ+ >). Then he sends one of them
to Alice and keeps another. Alice receives the photon and perform an operation in order to encode her information.
She can perform the operation
∧
σZ to encode her information ”1”. Else, she performs the operation I (do nothing) to
encode her information ”0” . Alice sends the encoded photon to Bob. Bob performs a measurement on both photons
1
in Bell operator basis to judge Alice’s operation. If the EPR pair in state |ψ+ >, then he know that Alice perform
an operation I, else, he know that Alice perform the operation
∧
σZ . This is a ping − pong protocol [3]. Through this
process, Bob can get one bit information from Alice. When Bob’s measurement with the result |φ± >, he knows that
there is Eve in the line and stops the communication. We will prove that if there is an Eve in the communication
line, Bob can find it certain without any public channel.
The algorithm for this protocol can like this: (1) Bob prepares two qubits in Bell states |ψ+ > or |φ+ > randomly.
(2) Bob sends one of the ERP pair to Alice and stores the other one. (3) Alice receives the one qubit, to perform the
her encoding operation. (4) Alice sends the qubit back to Bob. (5) Bob receives the back qubit and performs a basis
measurement on both photons in Bell operator basis {|φ+ >, |φ− >, |ψ+ >, |ψ− >}. (6) Suppose Bob used |ψ+ > this
time, after his measurement, if he finds the two photons in state |ψ+ >, then he know that Alice has encoded ’0’ in
this process. If Bob find two photons in state |ψ− >, then he knows that Alice has encoded ’1’ in this precess. Then
he will prepare next EPR pair and repeat this process. Else, if Bob finds the two photons are not in states |φ± >,
then he know that there is Eve in this communication line. The communication stops. (If Bob use |φ+ > this time,
after his measurement, if he finds the two photon in state |φ+ >, he knows that Alice has encoded ’0’ in this process.
If he finds the two photons in state |φ− >, Bob knows Alice has encode ’1’ in this process. If Bob finds the two
photons in states |ψ± >, he knows Eve in line. The communication stops.) We will prove that this process is secure.
Security proof . Eve can use all technique quantum mechanics laws allows. The aim of Eve is to find out which
operation Alice performs. But Eve has no chance to access Bob’s home qubit. All her operations only can operator
on the travel qubit. Bob select EPR pair in states |φ+ > or |ψ+ > randomly with a probability 1
2
every time. He
send one of the qubit to Alice. The state of the travel qubit is complete mixed to Eve
ρA = TrB{|ψ+ >< ψ+|} = TrB{|φ+ >< φ+|} = 1
2
IA. (4)
To Eve, it seems that Bob sends a qubit in state |0 > or |1 > with probability 1
2
every time. If Eve want to distinguish
what operations Alice operaters, she needs to attack the travel qubit before Alice’s operation. After Alice’s operation,
Eve needs to measure the bcak qubit.(This process is discribed in figure 1 and 2.) Eve can use all technique quantum
mechanics allows. The most general quantum operation is a completely positive map
ε : S(HA)→ S(HA) (5)
one the state space S(HA). Using the Stinespring dilation theorem [4], we know that any completely positive map
can be realized by a unitary operation on a larger Hilbert space. We can use an ancilla space HE and an ancilla state
|χ >∈ HE and a unitary operation
∧
E on HA ⊗HE to realize this completely positive map
ε(ρA) = TrE{
∧
E (ρA ⊗ |χ >< χ|)
∧
E+} (6)
where dimHE ≤(dimHA)2. If Eve want to gain information about Alice’s operation, she should first perform the
unitary operation
∧
E on the composed system, then let Alice perform her coding operation on the travel qubit. After
Alice’s operation, Eve will finally perform a measurement to judge which operation Alice performs. The state of the
travel qubit is a maximal mixture state
ρA =
1
2
|0 >< 0|+ 1
2
|1 >< 1| (7)
to Eve, which can be as a Bob sends the travel qubit in either of the states |0 > or |1 > with equal probability p = 1
2
.
In our proof, first we suppose Bob selects the EPR pair in state |ψ+ >. Second we suppose that Bob sends the
travel qubit in state |0 > to Alice. Eve adds an ancilla in the state |χ > and performs the unitary operation ∧E on
both systems, which will results in
|ψ0AE >=
∧
E |0, χ >= α|0, χ00 > +β|1, χ01 > (8)
where |χ0 >, |χ1 > are pure ancilla states uniquely determined by
∧
E, and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. We change this equation
into another form
d = |β|2 = 1− |α|2 (9)
2
It has been proved in [3] that if Eve want to get full information of Alice’s opeartion from the travel qubit, it must
result in that d = 1
2
. So equation (8) can be write as
|ψ0
AE
>=
1√
2
|0, χ00 > + 1√
2
|1, χ01 > (10)
After Eve’s attack opeartions, the travel qubit will be sent to Alice. Suppose Alice perform an operation
∧
σ
A
Z
|ψ0
AE
>= (|0 >< 0| − |1 >< 1|)( 1√
2
|0, χ00 > + 1√
2
|1, χ01 >) = 1√
2
|0, χ00 > − 1√
2
|1, χ01 > . (11)
to encode the information ’1’. After Alice’s encoding operation, the joint system that includes Bob’s home qubit, the
travel qubit and Eve’s ancilla space is in state
|ψ0BAE >=
1√
2
|0A, χ00, 1B > − 1√
2
|1A, χ01, 1B >= ( 1√
2
|0, χ00 > − 1√
2
|1, χ01 >)|1B > (*1)
And the system including the travel qubit and Eve’s ancilla space is in the state
|ψ0AE >=
1√
2
|0, χ00 > − 1√
2
|1, χ01 > (**1)
After Alice’s operation, Eve has to measure the travel photon. No measurement implies that Eve cannot get any
information about the travel photon. In this process, if Alice’ operation is I, then (*1) shoul be written as
|ψ0
BAE
>= (
1√
2
|0, χ00 > + 1√
2
|1, χ01 >)|1B > (*2)
and (**1) should be written as
|ψ0
AE
>=
1√
2
|0, χ00 > + 1√
2
|1, χ01 > (**2)
At the beginning of our proof, we have supposed that Bob sends the travel qubit in state |0 >. If Bob sends the travel
qubit in states |1 >, (*1) should be written as
|ψ1BAE >= (
1√
2
|0, χ00 > − 1√
2
|1, χ01 >)|0B > (*3)
and (**1) should be written as
|ψ1AE >=
1√
2
|0, χ10 > − 1√
2
|1, χ11 > (**3)
when Alice’s operation is
∧
σZ . And (*1) should be written as
|ψ1BAE >= (
1√
2
|0, χ10 > − 1√
2
|1, χ11 >)|0B > (*4)
(**1) should be written as
|ψ1AE >=
1√
2
|0, χ10 > − 1√
2
|1, χ11 > (**4)
when Alice’s operation is I. Eve can obtain information with certain by measurement on the travel qubit in basis
{ 1√
2
(|0, χ00 > +|0, χ01 >), 1√
2
(|0, χ00 > −|0, χ01 >), 1√
2
(|1, χ10 > +|1, χ11 >), 1√
2
(|1, χ10 > −|1, χ11 >)}. After Eve’s
measurement, the travel qubit will be sent to Bob. Bob does not know whether Eve exist or not, so there is
ρAB = TrE(|ψABE >< ψABE |). (12)
He measure the two photons in Bell basis, then
3
Tr(|ψ+ >< ψ+|ρAB) = 1
4
Tr(|ψ− >< ψ−|ρAB) = 1
4
Tr(|φ+ >< φ+|ρAB) = 1
4
Tr(|φ− >< φ−|ρAB) = 1
4
(13)
If Eve does not exist, which means d = 0, we can see when Alice performs operation I, there is
Tr(|ψ+ >< ψ+|ρAB) = 1
Tr(|ψ− >< ψ−|ρAB) = 0
Tr(|φ+ >< φ+|ρAB) = 0
Tr(|φ− >< φ−|ρAB) = 0 (14)
When Alice operator
∧
σ
A
Z
, Bob’s measurement result should be
Tr(|ψ+ >< ψ+|ρAB) = 0
Tr(|ψ− >< ψ−|ρAB) = 1
Tr(|φ+ >< φ+|ρAB) = 0
Tr(|φ− >< φ−|ρAB) = 0 (15)
We can see that we have supposed that Bob used the EPR pair in state |ψ+ > in this process. It is apparent that
when Eve exist, Bob will find his measurement result will be in the states |φ± > with probability 1
2
. In another word,
when Bob uses an EPR pair in states |ψ+ > in the communication but he find his measurement result is in states
|φ± >, he knows Eve is in line. The communication stops. For the same reason, when Bob select an EPR pair in
state |φ+ > to communicate with Alice but he finds his measurement result is in the state |ψ± >, he knows that Eve
is in line. The communication stops.
If Bob only uses EPR pair in state |ψ+ > in the communication, Eve can perform a measurement in her attack
operations to determine whether Bob sends the travel qubit in states |0 > or |1 >. After her measurement gained
Alice’s operation information, she can prepare the travel qubit in the states |0 > or |1 > as it is at the beginning.
When Bob selects EPR pair in states |ψ+ > or |φ+ > randomly with a probability p= 1
2
, Eve can not determine
which states Bob select by her measurement on the travel qubit. We have proved that this communication protocol
is secure.
We can see that when Eve wants to gain full information in each attack, the ping-pong protocol provides a detection
probability P = 1
2
. If Eve exist, after 1000 bits have been transmitted, the probability that Eve was not detected
becomes D ≈ 9.33e− 302, which means Eve has already been detected. In fig. 3, we have plotted the eavsdropping
sucess probability with d = 1
2
.
In our method, every travel photon can get one bit information back from Alice without Eve in line. Bob’s
measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis not only can help him to get information from Alice, but also
can can help him to determine whether Eve is in line or not. Obviously, there is no public channel in our method.
In BB84’s protocol [5], the states some photons have to be publicized to verdict the communication is secure. In
the ping-pong protocol [3], some EPR pair photons have to be publicized to judge whether Eve exist in line or not
through the public channel. In a secure communication protocal, first, an additionl public channel is not economical.
On the other hand, a public channel means all information through the public channel is open to Eve. The more
information Eve gains, the more difficult the secure communication becomes.
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Fig.3. Eavesdropping success probability as a function of d=0.5.
